



Journal of Transatlantic Studies

ISSN: 1479-4012 (Print) 1754-1018 (Online) Journal homepage: <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjts20>

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To cite this article: Alanna O'Malley (2016) 'What an awful body the UN have become!!' Anglo-American–UN relations during the Congo crisis, February–December 1961, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 14:1, 26–46, DOI: [10.1080/14794012.2015.1125164](https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2015.1125164)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2015.1125164>



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Published online: 17 Jan 2016.



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‘What an awful body the UN have become!!’[†] Anglo-American–UN relations during the Congo crisis, February–December 1961

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When Lord Salisbury passed the above remark in November 1961 it was at a moment of intense frustration for the British Foreign Office during the Congo crisis as the UN accelerated their efforts to restore territorial integrity to the Central African state by ending the secession of Katanga. The British viewed UN actions as a threat to their political and economic interests in the Congo and in Central Africa but crucially, also found that they were at loggerheads with the United States. This article examines Anglo-American relations at two key junctures in March and December 1961 when Britain successfully appealed to the United States to intervene in order to stall UN actions in the Congo. The cooperation between President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to constrain UN Congo policy reflects the centrality of the organisation in Anglo-American relations at the time and also highlights an understudied aspect of the relationship between the London and Washington. It will be shown that the crisis put a strain on the Anglo-American relations, leading to efforts by the British to play on the Cold War fears of the Americans by urging them to limit the actions of the UN. It is argued that the changing nature of the organisation helped to foster tensions in the Anglo-American relationship, exposing inherent differences of opinion about how American Cold War objectives should be balanced against the British agenda for decolonisation. The two incidents highlighted here reflect how the crisis became a challenge for Anglo-American relations and ultimately reveal the waning influence of the United States and the UK within the UN at the time.

Keywords: Anglo-American relations; United Nations; Congo crisis; Cold War; decolonisation

When the crisis erupted in the Congo immediately following independence on 30 June 1960, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was initially insouciant. Despite his prophetic ‘Winds of Change’ speech delivered in Cape Town earlier that year, he did not immediately perceive the Congo crisis as a challenge to Anglo-American relations, nor a threat to his own government. He declared bombastically that ‘MP’s might froth over their club claret but they were not going to risk their seats and

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[†]Letter from Chairman of the Monday Club Robert ‘Bobbety’ Salisbury, to British foreign Secretary Lord Home, 26 November 1961. FO 371/155107, National Archives London. Emphasis in the original. The Monday club was a pressure group within the Conservative party created in January 1961 in order to protect British interests and white minority regimes during the process of decolonisation. For further see Simon Ball, *The Guardsmen, Harold Macmillan, Three Friends and the World They Made* (London: Harper Perennial, 2005), 344–60.

their emoluments over a very large country a long way away of which they knew very little.¹ However, the Congo crisis was to prove more than just another colonial war of independence. By February 1961, Britain increasingly clashed with the United States during Congo negotiations at the UN and by December, the Macmillan Government faced a vote of confidence over the issue of whether or not to supply British bombs for the UN military campaign against the secessionist province Katanga. Moreover, real divisions began to emerge in Anglo-American relations as London and Washington D.C increasingly found themselves at odds as the Congo question exposed their fundamentally different approaches to decolonisation in Africa.

The conflict that erupted between the allies over how the Operations des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC)² should proceed during the Congo crisis has been traditionally underplayed in the literature on Anglo-American relations.³ Not only did the crisis threaten to divide two of the five Major Powers at the UN over how the organisation should proceed, it also proved to be a serious challenge to the Anglo-American relationship. With the combined contexts of the Cold War and decolonisation, the Congo crisis was a moment that revealed how American Cold War aims came into conflict with the British agenda for decolonisation. Despite Macmillan's nonchalance, the crisis posed a challenge to British economic and political interests in Africa. It particularly struck a chord among the Salisbury Tories given their support for Roy Welensky the white Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. He was firmly of the belief that the secession of the south-eastern province of Katanga from the rest of the Congo on 7 July 1960 was advantageous to British interests in the region. Much of the British Government's Congo policies were influenced by this conviction and the hesitancy to come to blows over the issue with Welensky, who carried some weight with the British Conservative Party, and the white-led Central African Federation.⁴ Britain also had several significant investments in the firm Tanganyika Concessions that had a 14.5% shareholding in the Belgian Union Minière du Haut Katanga Company, which controlled most of the resources of the Congo. Alongside the business interests of companies like Shell and Unilever, these economic considerations were further complicated by the fact that Katanga was critically important to the copper-belt in Central Africa which straddled the Northern Rhodesian border and affected British authorities in nearby states of Tanganyika and Uganda.⁵

For the United States, the Congo was of particular interest not least due to mounting hostilities with the USSR, but also because Katanga was a source of uranium used in the American atomic energy programme. In addition, as a whole in 1959 the Congo produced 69% of the world's industrial diamonds, 49% of its cobalt, and 9% of its copper. The United States, Britain and Belgium had been the forerunners in developing and processing these resources and minerals with trilateral trade agreements existing between them since 1944. By 1960, although the American dependence on Congolese uranium ores had decreased, there was still a cooperative economic framework between the three nations that developed the ores as a source of commercial energy power.⁶ In addition, the United States Inter-departmental Stockpile Committee (SSACB) viewed the Congo as of primary importance in the sourcing of borry and diamonds.⁷ Given this broad range of intertwined economic and political interests for both countries in the Congo, it did not initially appear that Congolese independence would threaten this Anglo-American nexus of power in Central Africa. It was the role

the UN was to play in the Congo which would exacerbate the tensions between Britain and the United States, and threaten to expose the disparity in their positions.

The UN proved to be a dynamic forum that in two separate incidents in February and December 1961 threatened to expose the conflict between Britain and the United States over the Congo question. The changing composition and structure of the deliberative forums of the Security Council and the General Assembly had severely eroded the power base of both Britain and the United States within the organisation. The debate that raged over the actions of ONUC had the effect of revealing their diminished capacity to control the evolution of events. As a former colonial power in the tense atmosphere of the General Assembly where emotions surrounding issues of decolonisation were running high, British prestige was damaged by allegations of collusion with subversive forces in Katanga. From Washington's point of view, far from being a dependable ally, the difference of opinion with Britain was revealing of the fragility of Western unity,⁸ the problems of being tarred by association with European colonial powers and the limits of Anglo-American influence within the UN.

This article will focus on two episodes, which reveal both the tensions in Anglo-American relations during the Congo crisis, and their failed efforts to contain UN action. Recently declassified documents from February 1961 reveal that following the adoption of the February Resolution that authorised UN peacekeepers for the first time to use force in self-defence, Britain appealed to the United States for a moratorium on further discussion of the Congo issue. In seeking to keep the Congo off the UN agenda, Britain wanted to avoid public discussion of the topic which might reveal the divergence in views with the United States over the question of how the resolution would be implemented. Although London succeeded in securing American support for the initiative, the Congo remained firmly on the UN agenda throughout the summer of 1961. Anglo-American efforts to temper further UN action and set the agenda for UN Congo policy failed as the Afro-Asian bloc, in cooperation with the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld called for the immediate implementation of the resolution. This resulted in military action in September 1961 as UN forces attempted to end the secession of the province of Katanga with military force. Far from avoiding further discussion of the Congo question, efforts to enforce a moratorium at the UN failed as the debate intensified over how the UN should proceed.

Anglo-American attempts to stall further UN military action in December 1961 were more successful. Facing a House of Commons vote of confidence in his government over the issue of supplying bombs to ONUC to use to end the secession of Katanga, Macmillan, having exhausted all his options at the UN, appealed to Kennedy for help. Following an intense discussion with the British Ambassador to the United States, David Ormsby-Gore, the President agreed to instruct his Chief UN Representative Adlai Stevenson to put pressure on the UN Secretary-General to arrange a ceasefire between UN troops and the Katangan Gendarmerie. The following day, UN Secretary-General U Thant announced a ceasefire in Katanga and Macmillan secured a majority vote in the House of Commons debate. As events transpired, the ceasefire was only temporary and the resulting armistice was flaunted less than two weeks later.

What is important about these two instances is that they highlight how Anglo-American cooperation attempted to shape the UN agenda in the Congo. In the first case, despite close Anglo-American negotiation, efforts to stall debate on the Congo

in New York failed. While this emphasises the importance of the UN dimension for Anglo-American relations, it is also revealing of the lack of influence the alliance had within that context. Although the December 1961 effort to halt further UN military action succeeded temporarily, the UN proceeded to end the secession definitively with a final military effort in December 1962. Both attempts to temper UN action and control the Congo agenda display not only the gravity of the Congo crisis for Anglo-American relations but also show how much importance Britain and the United States attached the maintenance of a united front on the question. While both British and American economic and strategic political interests were also in play, the intense negotiations that took place between London and Washington over the Congo question illustrate their differing motivations to control the UN agenda and ultimately served to shed light on how the crisis, through the UN, rendered the two countries in a deadlock.

The Congo crisis erupts

When the situation in the Congo exploded into a civil war that gained international dimensions with the intervention of the UN in July 1960, it was a period during which the Macmillan government in Britain were enjoying the fruits of friendly relations with the United States. The alliance between Macmillan and President Dwight D. Eisenhower had been revived as the Cold War struggle against international communism accelerated. Under the surface of Anglo-American unity however, disagreements surrounding British plans for decolonisation and policy on colonial questions at the UN simmered. The Congo crisis brought these disagreements to the surface in a way that caused Britain and the United States to recalibrate their UN policy, roughly agreeing to disagree on their failure to formulate a joint approach to the issue.

The British position on the Congo crisis was one of awkwardness from the beginning. As Lise Namikas describes, 'Britain ... cringed at any precedent-setting international intervention in what they deemed a private matter of decolonization.'⁹ When Hammarskjöld first brought the issue of intervention before the Security Council on 13 July 1960, both Britain and France abstained from voting for the resolution mandating intervention. Both Madeline Kalb and Namikas interpret their abstention as a way of papering over the cracks in the international consensus on the question by acceding to, if not voting for, the creation of ONUC. However in adopting this position, the British also began to define the character of their UN representation on the Congo question that would increasingly prove to be a position of avoidance and dissonance. Crucially, this proclivity towards avoiding any overt statements on the issue of UN intervention gradually portrayed Britain as resisting the efforts of the organisation in the Congo. This was in stark contrast to the clear support the United States granted ONUC from its inception and significantly, it highlights the opposing positions of Britain and the United States on the Congo question from the outset.

This apparent distance between the allies on the Congo, although reflective of wider challenges that would rise to the surface as the crisis progressed, stands out as a moment of intense disagreement during a longer period of good Anglo-American relations. The relationship between London and Washington flourished during the administration of President Eisenhower as old wartime camaraderie was revived to

help overcome the rift created by the Suez debacle in 1956. Eisenhower (who was the highest serving American general during the Second World War) and Macmillan (who had been an envoy in North Africa) had worked together in North Africa.¹⁰ Of all the possible choices, Macmillan has been referred to as 'the best suited to heal the transatlantic breach' following the Suez debacle.¹¹ An Anglo-American himself, his personal relationship with Eisenhower was an important avenue towards improving relations between London and Washington. Confirming this sense of growing intimacy towards the end of Eisenhower's presidency John Baylis points out that Britain provided a strong and stable ally for the United States throughout the darkest days of the Cold War and in return, the British were to establish a very fruitful deal in nuclear defence cooperation, signing in 1958 the *Agreement for Cooperation on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes*, which was later referred to as 'without a doubt one of the most important peacetime agreements ever arrived at between the two countries'.¹²

Efforts to strengthen the Anglo-American relationship were not without challenges, especially in the areas of nuclear and defence cooperation. The Skybolt-Holy Loch arrangement between Eisenhower and Macmillan in 1960 although referred to as reflective of a nuclear relationship 'enjoyed by no other ally of the United States',¹³ would draw Britain into controversy in 1962. When the administration changed in the United States with the advent of President John F. Kennedy, the 'Europeanist' camp in the State Department began to push American relations more towards Europe and less towards London. While the fabled 'Mac and Jack' relationship thrived rather unexpectedly, the Anglo-American dynamic subtly began to change. It quickly became apparent that despite Macmillan's determination to use the Anglo-American relationship as the bedrock of Britain's international prestige, his failed efforts at summitry in May 1960 signalled that Britain's role as a mediator between the superpowers was quite limited. The succeeding crises in Anglo-American relations over the Skybolt missiles issue in 1962 and the French veto of British entry to the EEC in 1963, tend to be interpreted as part of a wider pattern of British decline as a world power, or, in the view of Nigel J. Ashton, as representative of the irony of interdependence.¹⁴ In contrast, the Congo crisis offers an insight into the evolving dynamic of Anglo-American relations as being more than an inevitable tale of decline. In effect, Britain resistance towards American pressure to acquiesce and allow the UN to use force against Katanga exposed the inherent division between the allies over how American Cold War aims contrasted with British decolonisation and revealed the limits of Anglo-American influence in an organisation increasingly concerned with moderating these processes.

The Congo crisis has largely been absent from, or underplayed in, the existing literature on Anglo-American relations during this period. Only John Kent's recent work has sought to examine the character of the relationship during the crisis, which he assesses as being rather 'unspecial'. He argues that British refusal to consider using force to end the secession of Katanga was merely a cover for the protection of British economic interests in the province. Such was the extent of influence the Tanganyika Concessions company had with the Conservative party that, 'the short-term requirement to mitigate European companies' economic losses... was important enough politically to supersede the primacy of standing alongside the Americans'. Kent provides substantial evidence for this claim, illustrating the close links between the Foreign Secretary Lord Home and the Chairman of Tanganyika

Concessions and the extensive network of the Conservative Party's benefactors who were also closely associated with the company.¹⁵ The substantial influence of these networks manifested itself directly in British Congo policy, according to Kent, most clearly in British intransigence over the use of force by the UN to end the Katanga secession.

The secession of the south-eastern province of Katanga in July 1960 greatly exacerbated the crisis as a whole. The leader of the breakaway province Moïse Tshombe was largely held to be a Belgian stooge and Katanga was considered a 'white man's enclave' mainly controlled by the Belgian mining company Union Minière du Haut-Katanga and Tanganyika Concessions.¹⁶ During the first six months of the crisis, while the British held to their position that force could not be used by the UN to end the secession, the United States failed to coordinate a clear Congo policy. Eisenhower's speech to the UN General Assembly in 1960 reflected the rather lacklustre approach of the United States to the Congo question, echoing the American shock at developments through that summer. From the outbreak of the crisis, the United States had sought to limit Soviet expansion into Africa by positioning the UN between Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.¹⁷ In this way it was hoped that the irascible Lumumba would be deterred from turning to Moscow for help. What was unforeseen in Washington was Lumumba's unpredictable nature, to the extent that he would draw the ire of the Secretary-General within a month of the arrival of UN forces in Katanga.

Hammar skjöld visited the provincial capital Elisabethville in August 1960, partly to oversee the peaceful introduction of UN troops to Katanga, but also to assess the situation personally and try to negotiate with Tshombe. He had deliberately avoided consulting with Lumumba on his way through Leopoldville for fear that the Congolese Premier would disrupt the plans he had carefully negotiated in Brussels for the replacement of the Belgian troops in Katanga with the UN force. However, the introduction of ONUC troops and the opening of a dialogue with Tshombe had the effect of enraging Lumumba who accused the Secretary-General of ignoring his government, declaring, 'The government and people of the Congo have lost their confidence in the Secretary-General.'¹⁸ Hammar skjöld was infuriated with Lumumba's response, and the latter's refusal to meet with him during his return journey through Leopoldville. The Secretary-General even declined to delay his return to New York by one day so that the Congolese delegation could travel with him.¹⁹ At the heart of the dispute between Hammar skjöld and Lumumba was not just the failure of political ethics but a real disagreement over what the ONUC force was to be used for. Hammar skjöld was adamant that the force was there to prevent civil war in the Congo by hastening the removal of Belgian troops. However, Lumumba viewed the UN force as a means by which he could militarily end the secession. Hammar skjöld's failure to consult with the Congolese government before his public meeting with Tshombe combined with his refusal to help Lumumba end the Katangan secession had the effect of radicalising Lumumba's views. Now, he turned to Moscow for help.

On 15 August, Lumumba issued telegrams to the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union requesting military aid and personnel.²⁰ In order to demonstrate his commitment to sacking the UN, he included copies of his correspondence with Hammar skjöld. While Khrushchev's response was decidedly muted, the Soviet leader agreed to send, in addition to the food and medical aid the USSR had already supplied, 15 Ilyushin-18 planes for troop transportation, and weapons and ammunition

for Lumumba's military campaign to end the secession of Katanga.²¹ While this appeal for Soviet aid would not have a decisive effect on Lumumba's campaign against Katanga, it did have major significance for US policy.

The apparent swing towards Russia was met with shock and disbelief in the State Department. Kalb argues that Lumumba's repudiation of Hammarskjöld threatened to unhinge American policy in the Congo as a whole by creating space for the Soviets to destabilise the Congolese government.²² The prevention of the extension of Soviet influence into Africa through the Congo was at the very core of American policy. Lumumba's flirtation with Khrushchev had the effect of making him a persona non grata in the United States but crucially, it also reignited the idea of removing the African leader from power in order to regain control of the situation. Ousting Lumumba took place in two stages. The first was an American sponsored coup in Leopoldville, whereby the American embassy supported President Joseph Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba as Congolese Prime Minister on 5 September. Larry Devlin, Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station in the Congolese capital, details how his agents helped to organise anti-Lumumba protests in the capital in order to supplant his image as a popular, legitimate leader.²³

Lumumba responded to his dismissal by announcing that he was the only elected leader in the Congo and in turn, he fired President Kasavubu, essentially creating a vacuum of power and making the complex political situation in Leopoldville, even more precarious. The CIA followed up on their initial attempts to get rid of Lumumba by sponsoring another coup, this time led by General Mobutu, the Chief of the Congolese army. Devlin recounts assuring Mobutu that the US government would recognise a new government under Kasavubu and even pledged financial support for the operation.²⁴ Mobutu effectively dismissed the Congolese government and installed his 'College of Commissioners' by the end of September. As the CIA set about the second leg of their plan to get rid of Lumumba permanently, the United States shifted their focus to the General Assembly where a campaign to generate support for the recognition of Kasavubu's UN delegation, rather than Lumumba's, as the official representatives of the Congo was launched.²⁵ Lumumba had marked his cards by swinging towards Moscow and openly breaking relations with Hammarskjöld. However, his elimination did nothing to clarify US policy, nor build a consensus on the Congo with London. Rather, his assassination had the effect of inflaming tensions on all sides in 1961.

Fanning the flames of discord – the February resolution

While Lumumba's fate had effectively been sealed by his swing towards Moscow, it was only in February 1961 that the news of his assassination became public. The announcement had the effect of radicalising more neutral members of the Afro-Asian bloc, who immediately denounced the role of the Britain, the United States and the UN in the crisis. This came on the back of mounting pressure on the United States to take some form of affirmative action over Congo. In particular this pressure came from the Belgians who were extremely concerned with developments in the country. In a telegram from the American Ambassador in Brussels, William Burden outlined the gravity of devising a coherent stance on the issue, urging:

I am fully aware that unilateral measures outside the framework of general Western policy can serve only to destroy the position of Belgium and the West in the UN and in Africa

without any countervailing advantage, but the situation is in part a result of the vacuum created by failure to formulate clear and effective US policy. If we are not able to formulate clear US policy on Congo ... to deal with the rapidly detonating situation and sell it to our allies rather soon, different elements in Belgium will ... continue to supply their own paramilitary ad hoc solutions.²⁶

The potential implications of such actions were not lost to the new administration under President Kennedy. Secretary of State Dean Rusk remarked to his staff even before Lumumba's assassination was revealed that: 'the stakes are so large that we need to take the ceiling off our thinking as to solutions'.²⁷

On 1 February, Kennedy approved the revised US–Congo policy, the three principle elements of which were; a new mandate for ONUC which would increase their authority to control all military elements in the Congo, the reestablishment of a functioning government in Leopoldville and increased efforts to block outside assistance.²⁸ While the plan granted precedence to action through the UN, sources reveal that behind the scenes the United States was not ruling out the possibility of unilateral action if the situation required it. Rusk maintained that if this proved to be the case, 'it would be essential to show that we had exerted ourselves to work effectively through the UN'.²⁹ Whatever efforts the United States may have been making to hedge their bets, the situation began to spin out of control when the Afro-Asian bloc introduced a draft resolution that called for the UN troops to be given the right to use force in self-defence as a last resort to prevent full blown civil war.³⁰ Although the State Department was divided as to whether or not to support this resolution, the United States eventually voted for a version on 21 February that included some elements of their original plan.

The issue of the use of force, which the British were so opposed to, was now set front and centre in the UN debates on the Congo. During deliberations, the British remained strongly opposed to the use of force against Katanga which for Macmillan in particular would be a two-fold blow; threatening British economic interests in the region and politically difficult because of Tory support for the Central African Federation and Roy Welensky's relentless defence of Tshombe.³¹ Considering these serious political implications, the British viewpoint on the amended US–Congo policy was less than enthusiastic. As Alan James describes: 'an orderly, ideologically quiescent, and weakened country such as Britain was not inclined to wax enthusiastic over what could be interpreted as UN adventurism'.³² This attitude was reflected by the Chief British Representative at the UN Sir Patrick Dean, who 'was convinced that the UN had done all it could in the Congo'. In the same vein, the head of the Foreign office African Department believed that 'the UN effort should end'.³³

The British were however wary of isolating themselves within the UN, noting ahead of the Security Council meeting that,

in order to avoid a deadlock in which we might alienate the sympathies of the moderate Africans and make them withdraw their support from the UN effort, we could, in the last resort, accept the amendments the Americans proposed as a minimum.³⁴

Although James argues that Britain equivocated in this instance in order maintain influence with the Afro-Asians, and prevent a break with the Americans, the African Department reported to the Cabinet following the passing of the resolution that the British had succeeded in entering a clarification that the resolution could not be used to empower the UN to use force to impose a political settlement.³⁵ In

this way, the British sought as a minimum to influence how the resolution would be implemented. Further, the following month policy planners in Whitehall drafted a position paper for British initiatives at the UN, and formed a set of proposals for the direction of Western policy towards the Congo issue. Though officials understood the importance of outwardly maintaining support for the resolution as they recognised that it would hold the African states in some form of agreement over what was to happen in the Congo, they were not prepared to stand idly by and let the UN take full control of the situation.³⁶ The agreement for a moratorium on the issue was part of the British effort to stall the UN efforts in this vein.

While the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office were busy strategising about how to limit the effect of the resolution, concerns were also being raised in the State Department over the direction of British colonial policy. During the week following the passing of the resolution, Kennedy dispatched Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Averell Harriman on a visit to London, Bonn and Rome in order to drum up support among the relevant heads of state.³⁷ Over dinner in Admiralty House, Macmillan emphasised the great work that Britain was doing in unwinding the empire and decried the activities of Undersecretary of State for African Affairs George Mennen ('Soapy') Williams in Africa:³⁸ 'It was deeply wounding to Britain when the United States Government or Americans individually accused the UK of being an evil reactionary influence and pilloried her in the United Nations.' He implored Harriman to communicate to the President that all Britain wanted to do was to be left alone for a few years in order to finish the job of dismantling the empire. 'If American sniping at British policy went on,' he said, 'bitter feelings would be aroused in the UK which would do real damage to Anglo-American relations.'³⁹ Harriman expressed surprise at the level of British resistance to the resolution stating that the American position was that the United Nations effort could work, provided that the propaganda efforts of the Russians could be halted.

These simmering differences between London and Washington soon threatened to come to the surface over the issue of how the resolution would be implemented. Although, British UN officials had initially consoled themselves with the notion that the resolution would have no immediate effect in the Congo, it was clear that the question was beginning to raise tensions. Whitehall officials were under the impression that the United States were 'overly sensitive to Afro-Asian opinion', which had the effect of granting too much legitimacy to ONUC.⁴⁰ A senior British Foreign Office official reported in April 1961 that

the use of force by the United Nations not going to produce an answer in the Congo. The Congolese are learning to be quite skilful at non-violent non-cooperation which is liable to develop (as in India in the old days) into occasional violence.⁴¹

In an attempt to limit the possibility to use the resolution to end the secession, and crucially, in order to prevent the possibility of a public schism with the Americans, Britain secured guarantee from the United States for a moratorium on the Congo at the UN. Conceding that the crisis was proving detrimental to Western unity, the State Department recommended President Kennedy to agree to a limiting of the debate on the Congo.⁴² In avoiding the public debates, the United States agreed to 'work in the United Nations corridors in order to head off or defeat radical resolutions which may be presented and to encourage a moderate outcome'.⁴³

This decision to introduce a moratorium on the Congo issue was a direct response to the, by now, obviously different Anglo-American positions on the question, and the general feeling of 'advancing steadily into a bog with no way out'.⁴⁴ As Dean surmised it, 'we keep on saying that we are there to give the United Nations full support ... at the same time we are not ready in fact to back the Secretary-General up to the extent which he thinks necessary to accomplish his purpose'. He continued,

we are drifting into an increasingly difficult position ... although we avowedly support the UN effort we really do not want it to succeed too well ... The time really has come when we ought to think out carefully what our objective is and if possible reach agreement about it with the Americans.

British reports from the UN indicated that the debate on the Congo in the current atmosphere was damaging to their interests, to their relationship with other countries and to the UN as a whole.⁴⁵ The moratorium for a debate on the Congo did little to effect any change in the atmosphere at the UN or solve the crisis in the Congo; by May 1961 the organisation still faced the same questions over the reintegration of Katanga and the United States continued to urge Britain to pressure Tshombe into negotiations.⁴⁶

The agreement in April 1961 to introduce a moratorium on the Congo debate was as much to disguise the widening gulf between the British and the Americans, as it was an effort to regain some control over the UN and avoid a damaging disagreement in the atmosphere of hostility that pervaded in New York. The decision on the part of Kennedy's administration in 1961 to shift the American stance on the Congo was directly related to ensuring that the Soviets did not expand their influence in Central Africa but crucial was also the maintenance of favourable relations with the increasingly powerful Afro-Asian bloc. The American consent to a 'moratorium',⁴⁷ on the Congo issue at the prompting of the British should not be read solely as the influence of the British government on American Congo policy. What it does display, is that considerations of Anglo-American relations played a role in policy-making at the UN in particular where the Western dominance was under threat. In this instance, the public nature of debate at the UN threatened to undermine Anglo-American efforts to coordinate Congo policy. It also set the tone for the Anglo-American dynamic on the issue; the struggle to limit the actions of the organisation in the Congo and the increasing difference of opinion over how the organisation should proceed. The Congo again brought the two countries into conflict in December 1961 when they sought once more to limit the actions of the UN. While the April moratorium proved to be a small concession, the United States intervened for a second time at the UN in response to another British request in December. Similarly, the intervention did little to contain the organisation, nor moderate its actions in the Congo but it did reflect London's ability to play on the Cold War fears of the Americans in order to protect British interests during the crisis.

Using force again – December 1961

On 28 August 1961, the UN launched a surprise military campaign codenamed Operation Rumpunch in Katanga. ONUC troops began disarming Katangan troops, and seized the major buildings around Elisabethville in an effort to force Tshombe and his

Belgian political advisors to withdraw from the province. The surprise nature of the move caught Tshombe off-guard and he agreed to comply immediately if the operation was halted.⁴⁸ The response to Rumpunch in Brussels and London was vigorous opposition. British Foreign Secretary Lord Home even proposed pointing out to Hammarskjöld that 'stability in Katanga depended on maintaining the Tshombe administration'.⁴⁹ The United States continued to give the Secretary-General tacit support, which soon melted away when, in order to seize the gains made in the first round, the ONUC followed up by launching Operation Morthor on 13 September 1961.⁵⁰ The result was disastrous. This time the Katangan gendarmerie were prepared, and fierce fighting broke out in Elisabethville while air strikes halted the advancement of ONUC forces. The diplomatic fallout was equally damaging. Kennedy was said to be 'extremely upset' that Hammarskjöld had authorised the operation without consulting with Washington.⁵¹ Britain was equally incensed and Macmillan publicly threatened to withdraw British support for the operation. The Americans attempted to press Hammarskjöld into negotiating a cease-fire with Tshombe. On 17 September the Secretary-General's plane crashed on the way to the negotiating table in Ndola, killing all onboard.

The devastating impact of the suspicious death of Hammarskjöld,⁵² combined with the political damage of the operation against Katanga, raised the issue of use of force again between Britain and the United States. On 1 November, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar telegraphed the State Department with the reflections of the British Government on the development of policy in the Congo. The memo included a long discussion of the mandate granted to the UN and how it was to be weighed against the circumstances of potential civil war. Crucially however, it concluded that

The Resolution does not authorise the use of force against Tshombe to subdue Katanga as a political measure. It does justify the use of force against him if that is necessary to prevent a civil war. Exactly at what point the use of force would be justified is a matter for appreciation.⁵³

Significantly the memo also pressed the urgent need for further consultation with the United States on this matter revealing Britain recognition that the United States policy in the Congo was still on a divergent course to that of Whitehall. The effort to conceal these Anglo-American differences was to prove imperative the following month when Britain faced a serious crisis over the question of bombs for the UN.

A crucial factor in the failure of Operation Morthor had been the fact that the United Nations were severely materially disadvantaged due to a lack of aircraft with which to respond to the air attacks from Katanga. It was agreed in Washington that the supply of aircraft to the UN would be a central part of the implementation of the Security Council Resolution 24 November 1961.⁵⁴ The most significant number of aircraft at the disposal of the UN for this operation was six Canberra jets, in the possession of India, but British-made. Therefore, Britain was requested to supply the bombs. This was highly controversial for Macmillan however, it was widely felt that such a gesture would have a very negative impact on Tshombe and on the powerful Katanga lobby within the Conservative Party. At a Cabinet meeting on 14 November, it was noted that the supply of such bombs would cause serious domestic political difficulties and there was 'bound to be keen criticism'.⁵⁵ The extent of British opposition

to the use of force in Katanga was simultaneously highlighted when it was noted by the Cabinet that 'It would not be in our interests nor would it help our multi-racial policies in Africa if Mr Tshombe were overthrown.'⁵⁶

Indeed as his biographer Alistair Horne aptly describes it, 'although in spirit Macmillan was with Katanga, he continued to pay lip-service to the United Nations'.⁵⁷ In such a position, the Prime Minister took the decision on 7 December to supply twenty-four 1000-pound bombs for use against Tshombe's mercenary flyers. This was in accordance with an agreement that Home would increase the pressure on the United States to urge the new Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula to the negotiation table with Tshombe, thereby hopefully avoiding the situation in which the bombs would ever be required for use.⁵⁸ In an exchange of letters between Acting UN Secretary-General U Thant and Dean, the UK specified the terms and conditions under which these bombs were donated, outlining that they were only to be used in self-defence and against the airstrips from where the opposite fleet departed.⁵⁹ However, the damage was effectively done; the request for bombs had been granted and now, as Macmillan put it: 'we were in for a row'.⁶⁰

The agitation of the British Cabinet was fuelled by the contradicting statements coming from the UN on what precisely the aims of the organisation in Katanga were, and how exactly the bombs would be used. Contrary to assurances given to Dean by Thant on 8 December, Sture Linner, Officer-in-Charge in the Congo, gave a controversial interview to a Swedish newspaper the following day in which he stated that the long-term aim of the United Nations was to force a political solution on Katanga by smashing the present political leadership and their military strength. 'He also maintained that United Nations officials in the Congo had carte blanche for the conduct of military operations there.'⁶¹ To the horror of the Foreign Office, it appeared that Britain was playing a part in what they had consistently railed against from the beginning; the quashing of the Katangan secession by force.

Things really began to fall apart when Ethiopian soldiers in the service of the UN killed three Red Cross workers.⁶² These inconsistencies between statements from UN in New York, and the actual events in Katanga created chaos around the issue of the supply of bombs in the Westminster Cabinet room where the Lord Privy-Seal noted that this was 'not entirely satisfactory to us for it still left it open to United Nations forces to secure military control over the whole of Katanga on the grounds that they were securing their lines of communication'.⁶³ Effectively the British were now caught in a no-win position. The decision to supply the bombs, with or without attaching conditions for their use, opened the government up to attack from the Katanga lobbyists within the Conservative Party. However, to withdraw the statement which promised the bombs would make it appear that the government had changed its mind, and likely stir up allegations of succumbing to pressure from such supporters of Katangan independence. In addition Dean cabled the Foreign Secretary from the UN that 'our reputation here will suffer severely' if Britain revoked the promise to supply the bombs.⁶⁴ Caught between the UN and the Conservatives, the decision of the Cabinet was, predictably, to take the middle ground. Britain agreed to supply the bombs if Thant guaranteed that they would be used only in self-defence and additionally, the British representatives in Katanga would use all their influence to urge Tshombe to negotiate an agreement with the Central Government for the end of the secession.⁶⁵

Relations with the United States were also effected by the British stance over the bombs for the UN affair as it confirmed the fears of the State Department about London's hostile attitude to the ONUC in Katanga.⁶⁶ The President himself was coming under intense pressure from the outcry over atrocities committed in the region, both from the British and the Belgians but also from the Afro-Asians at the UN who increasingly urged the Secretary-General to quash the secession.⁶⁷ The tense atmosphere in the White House was recorded in a conversation on the Congo between Under-Secretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland in October when the latter noted that 'what is bothering the President is that people have been getting to him'.⁶⁸ The position of the United States was at this stage edging closer to the UN and the Afro-Asian states, who, armed with their resolution of 24 November, advocated for further use of force to definitively end the secession. The United States was well aware of the growing rift with the British and while Kennedy was adamant about the importance of maintaining Western unity, at the same time he was insistent that there could be no ceasefire until Tshombe agreed to negotiate.⁶⁹ Domestically, the conflict was also squeezing Kennedy as the well-financed Katanga lobby in Washington, led by Senator Thomas J. Dodd and the Senate Minority leader Everett M. Dirksen announced on 13 December the formation of the Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom fighters.⁷⁰ It has also been argued that Kennedy did not want a major fall-out with Macmillan over the Congo just weeks before the two were to meet in Bermuda to discuss the resumption of atmospheric nuclear tests.⁷¹ One point was clear; the United States would not support British efforts to arrange a ceasefire through the UN, unless Tshombe could be forced to negotiate.

In addition to the realisation the London and Washington were growing apart on the Katanga question, Macmillan's government was still facing a significant threat from within the ranks of the backbenches. The Conservative Party was split between those who believed that this gesture was not enough to bring about a whole solution to the crisis and the Katangan lobbyists, urged on by the cries of indignation from Welensky. Peter Clarke argues that Macmillan's ambiguity was one of his finest political assets, helping him 'quell the Conservative right wing, which was rarely confronted with the fact that the Prime Minister's policies were out of kilter with his rhetoric'.⁷² However, in this instance the discrepancy between Macmillan's rhetoric and his policies was widely exposed and given Tory sympathies for significant business interests in Katanga, and their allegiance with Welensky, Macmillan potentially faced a vote of no confidence in his government over the issue when it was announced that the bombs would be used to smash Tshombe's forces. As Macmillan noted in his diary, 'the trouble in the Party is that in addition to the small group of people who really hate me ... the anxiety about [the] United Nations performance in the Congo had spread to the whole *centre* of the Party'.⁷³

The challenge to Macmillan's leadership came in the form of a House of Commons debate on foreign affairs, on the 14 December, which included a motion that approved of the Government's actions over the whole affair. The level of personal anxiety Macmillan was feeling about this was well expressed in his 15 December letter to the Queen in which he observed, 'The 1000 lb bomb however became the detonator of a kiloton row, which threatened yesterday to become almost a megaton row in the House of Commons'.⁷⁴ The playing field for the debate was such; the Labour Party, the Liberals and broadly speaking the 'left wing' of the Conservative party supported the UN

action in opposition to the right-wing and centre Tories, who believed the Government had reneged on their promise not to let Katanga be crushed by the UN.⁷⁵ Facing the Commons debate on 14 December, there is general agreement that Macmillan went into 'something approaching a flap, or even a panic'.⁷⁶ To all concerned it appeared that his government may well fall over the Congo issue.

If the source of Macmillan's problems lay at the UN, it was also there he could potentially find the solution. If the question of further use of force by ONUC against Katanga could be avoided by arranging a ceasefire, the UN action could be contained and the diplomatic impasse in which Macmillan found himself both with the United States and his own party could be resolved. However, the efforts of the British UN delegation and the Foreign Office to rein back UN action at this point were revealing of their lack of influence within the organisation. Cabling the Foreign Office on 11 December, Dean warned that it would be impossible to summon a Security Council meeting unless an agreement could be reached with the Americans who 'take a different view about the present situation in the Congo and are clearly prepared to go further in support of the United Nations and the use of force in Katanga than we would deem desirable'.⁷⁷ Furthermore, he warned that even if an agreement was reached with the United States, securing seven votes on the Security Council would be virtually impossible while in the process, Britain would be heavily attacked by the Afro-Asians who would try 'to make us the scapegoat for the United Nations lack of success'.⁷⁸

With no possible avenue for restraining the UN available through the organisation, Macmillan, desperate to garner votes for the Commons debate, telephoned Kennedy on the 13 December in order to enlist his support in halting the UN action in the Congo. He pressed that Britain believed the UN were exceeding their mandate and making it look like they would quash the breakaway province by force.⁷⁹ It fell to British Ambassador to the United States, David Ormsby Gore, to germinate these seeds of concession. Over dinner that night, Ormsby Gore, who was a close personal friend of the President, came up trumps. In the presence of the Ambassador, Kennedy telephoned Ball and instructed him accordingly: 'I have got David Gore sitting beside me here, and he will explain what it is the British Government wants done, and I want it done.'⁸⁰ It is important to note that there were simultaneous negotiations on-going between Ball and Rusk, who telephoned from a NATO Foreign Minister's meeting in Paris that the Congo question was the most important issue on the table. Home had warned Rusk that if the fighting spread, the British government would have to completely withdraw support.⁸¹ The combination of pressures was enough to urge Kennedy into action and the result was a diplomatic success. The following day, U. Thant announced a ceasefire in Katanga and Macmillan emerged with a majority of 94 votes in the Commons, leading the President to remark: 'Well, that was a pretty good majority; I wonder whether we needed to have gone to all that trouble the other night in order to get it?'⁸²

This victory for Macmillan and Anglo-American relations was short-lived. Although it temporarily produced a ceasefire and the Kitona Agreement in which Tshombe acceded to the re-integration of Katanga, he rolled back on his consent almost immediately as soon as he arrived back in Elisabethville, by insisting that he had been forced to sign it under duress.⁸³ Similarly, despite the effort to paper over the cracks, this was the last time the British were able to play on the Cold War paranoia of the Americans to try to limit UN action against Katanga. While they

continued to cling to their position against the use of force, they were increasingly marginalised within the organisation from this point forwards on the issue of the Congo, especially as the United States henceforth formulated its Congo policy without taking note of British concerns. This was most obvious in December 1962 when, despite another personal appeal from Macmillan to Kennedy at the Nassau conference to hold back the UN from military action against Katanga, the President turned a deaf ear to British pleas.

From 28 December 1962 to the 3 January 1963, UN military forces moved into Katanga and quashed Tshombe's regime. The question remains why, only 12 months later, the United States refused to listen to British requests for the United States to try to moderate UN action. Ashton has argued that American unwillingness to use their influence again with the Secretary-General was made clear through their support, politically and militarily of Operation Grandslam. 'In the last resort, Kennedy had decided that it was more important to bring an end to the Katangan secession, and forestall any possibility of Soviet intervention, than heed to British special pleading.'⁸⁴ It was also true that the rigidity of the American objection to the use of force against Katanga had exhausted the patience of the State Department who in November, 1962, described British leadership at the UN as 'desultory', pointing out that this had further damaged the Western position on various issues.⁸⁵ This aimless British attitude had also exposed the government to allegations of collusion with Tshombe and his Belgian advisors, particularly when Britain refused to support economic sanctions against the leader of the breakaway province. After the Cuban missiles incident, and with increasing sporadic violence across the Congo, the United States moved decisively away from the British position, in the process, further attempting to reassert their authority over the UN in an effort to pursue their Cold War agenda.

Conclusion

Despite successive efforts to conceal Anglo-American differences over the Congo question, the gulf between London and Washington was unbridgeable. As Dean himself noted ruefully, 'It is not for lack of consultation, whether in Washington or in New York, that this differing attitude has persisted.'⁸⁶ As the crisis developed, the British feeling that the UN was a 'damned nuisance'⁸⁷ led them to maintain a position of intransigence on the Congo which brought them no closer to resolving the issue with the United States. After 1961, Britain sought to spin out the crisis with as little involvement as possible whereas the United States attempted to reassert their influence over the direction of UN Congo policy. At the centre of these differences were opposing positions on the question of the use of force by the UN in Katanga, and the overall thrust of UN Congo policy combined with the problems by the ways in which the Cold War interacted with decolonisation in the Congo. The American efforts to prevent the infiltration of Soviet influence into the country, led the State Department to grant increasing political and financial support to the UN operation against Katanga. American officials viewed the secession as destabilising for Congolese independence and formulated their policy around the strengthening of the Central Government in Leopoldville and the eventual reuniting of the country. This was in direct contrast to the British who developed Congo policy around the issue of protecting their economic interests and networks in Katanga, which were an important part

of the wider programme of British decolonisation in Africa. The acceleration of Cold War hostilities directly conflicted with British efforts to prevent the loss of their networks by the quashing of the secession by force. The question of the use of force by the UN was in many ways used as a foil by both sides to skirt around their opposing strategic considerations.

Crucially, it was the UN in three distinct dimensions that brought these problems to the surface during 1961. In March, the damaging nature of the public debate at the UN led the British to seek an agreement for a moratorium from the United States. The UN climate, at that time reeling from the news of the assassination of Lumumba, was particularly hostile towards the Western powers. The increasingly influential Afro-Asian bloc, whose cause was championed by Hammarskjöld, dominated the debates in the General Assembly, to the extent that Britain and the United States sought, unsuccessfully, to keep the Congo question off the agenda. Their efforts and failure to do so point to the impact of UN debates on Anglo-American relations and the limits of their influence what the General Assembly chose to discuss.

The request for a ceasefire in December highlights another dimension of the UN, which at this time came to bear on Anglo-American relations: that of the UN as an actor, through ONUC in the Congo. The inconsistencies that have been described between instructions issued from New York and their interpretation and implementation on the ground served to render the active capacity of the UN as a rather unwieldy and difficult instrument. Anglo-American efforts to stall further military action received only limited success and the UN went on to end the secession militarily just a year later. Moreover, the military actions of the UN troops raised the question of how and when the UN could use force, which was the central disagreement between the United States and the UK. Quite apart from the potential damage of public debates, the actions of ONUC represented another way in which the UN challenged the Congo polices of both countries.

The third dimension of the UN is evident in both instances, and that is the importance of maintaining Western unity in a multi-lateral forum where the Afro-Asians increasingly controlled the UN Congo agenda. For the United States, keeping a united Western position at the UN during the crisis was essential to sustain their power bloc. The position of the West was increasingly marginalised due to the advent of the Afro-Asians but also due to the rhetorical attacks from the USSR. Although alignment with NATO allies, and crucially the former colonial powers of Britain and France, threatened to tar the Americans by association and open them up to accusations of neo-colonialism, the 'Europeanists' at the State Department and Kennedy himself consistently tried to paper over the cracks in the consensus. For the British, this aspect of UN relations was also important as the Foreign Office was eager to maintain favourable relations with remaining colonies and newly decolonised African states. The powerful vitriol of the Afro-Asian bloc did little to advance this cause and threatened to destabilise British relations with the Central African Federation. In these three capacities the UN brought the Congo crisis to bear on Anglo-American relations in a way that changed British conceptions of the organisation as becoming an 'awful body'.

The two moments of Anglo-American efforts to reassert their authority at the UN that are highlighted here serve to characterise their relationship over the Congo. For the most part it was a struggle to cooperate and formulate a joint approach and most often the United States and the UK failed to limit the actions of the UN.

Their efforts can be viewed not just as an attempt to influence UN policy and maintain Western unity but also to mask internal differences in opinion over core issues. What is evident is that both the UN and the broader international environment with its undercurrent of the struggle between nationalism and imperialism are features of the Congo crisis which directly affected British and American interests in Africa in a similar way to events that had occurred during the Suez conflict. What was different about the Congo was that the nature of the UN had changed entirely and the joint Anglo-American action did little to neither advance their interests nor maintain their influence. The tendency towards inclusive internationalism in order to safeguard both American and British positions at the UN but also Anglo-American relations as a whole, was rendered fruitless as the UN ultimately brought an end to the Congo crisis on their own terms. Instead, Britain and the United States had found that they had fundamentally different visions of how to order the decolonised world.

Notes

1. Simon Ball, *The Guardsmen, Harold Macmillan, Three Friends and the World They Made* (London: Harper Perennial, 2005), 362–3.
2. Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) was the acronym given to the United Nations Mission in the Congo from 1960–1964.
3. John Kent, *America, the UN and Decolonisation, Cold War Conflict in the Congo* (London: Routledge, 2010), 2. David Reynolds, “‘A Special Relationship’: Anglo-American relations since 1945, ‘Rethinking Anglo-American relations’”, *International Affairs*, 62, no. 1 (1985): 1–20. Nigel J. Ashton, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship, Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2006). John Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939–1984, the special relationship*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984). Ritchie Owendale, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998). Alan Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century, of friendship, conflict and the rise and decline of superpowers* (London: Routledge, 1995). C.J. Bartlett, ‘The Special Relationship’, *A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (London: Longman, 1992). David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled, British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2000). Hedley Bull and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., *The ‘Special Relationship’: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). John Dickie, *Special No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1994). Robert M. Hathaway, *Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations Since World War II* (Boston, MA: Twayne, 1990). Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee, eds., *Harold Macmillan: Aspects of a Political Life* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). Madeleine G. Kalb, *The Congo Cables, The Cold War in Africa – From Eisenhower to Kennedy* (New York: Macmillan, 1982). Richard D. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in the Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). David N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention, Mines, Money and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Susan Williams, *Who Killed Hammarskjöld? The UN, The Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa* (London: Hurst and Company, 2011). Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960–1964* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). John Kent, ‘Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1963: The not so Special Relationship’, in *Britain in Global Politics, Volume 2*, ed. John W. Young et al. (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 119–38. Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence, January 1960–December 1961* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1965).
4. It is generally accepted in the broad body of literature that Britain had considerable economic interest in the Congo, specifically through the Union Minière company. See generally

- Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention*. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War, 113.
5. Nigel J. Ashton, 'Anglo-American Revival and Empire during the Macmillan Years', in *The British Empire in the 1950s, Retreat or Revival?* ed. Martin Lynn (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 175.
 6. There was in fact a significant tension between Britain, the US and Belgium over the financing of the projected Belgian atomic energy programme since the 1944 Tripartite Agreement which agreed to pay the Belgian Government rather than the extracting firm, for Congolese uranium. Britain and the United States were unwilling to continue to finance the project unless this was tied to specific plans whereas the Belgians wanted funding more in the form of compensation for training Belgian researchers in America and 'just damages for the wrong [we] Belgians have had to suffer. They believed the source of this funding should be a surtax on Congolese uranium which would make it more expensive for the American programme. Jonathan E. Helmreich, *United States Relations with Belgium and the Congo, 1940–1960* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1998), 134–5.
 7. Inter-departmental Memo, 15 October, 1965, Subject Files, Congo, Special Files: Public Service, Kennedy/Administrations, 1958–1971, Folder 5, Subject File Congo (1), Box 448, Averell Harriman Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
 8. See Carole J.L. Collins, *The Cold War Comes to Africa: Cordier and the 1960 Congo Crisis*, *Journal of International Affairs*, 47, no. 1 (1993): 256. Also Kent, 'Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1963: The not so Special Relationship'.
 9. Lise Namikas, *Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo 1960–1965* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). 73. See also Kalb, *Congo Cables*, 13.
 10. General Eisenhower had served as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe during the Second World War and, based partly in London, had established a good working relationship with Macmillan who served in the wartime coalition in the Ministry of Supply and the Colonial Ministry before being sent, in 1942, to North Africa as the British Government representative to the Allies in the Mediterranean. Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations*, 92.
 11. David Dimbleby, David Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart, The Relationship Between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Random House, 1988), 237–8.
 12. Baylis, *Anglo-American Defence Relations*, 90. This was however, before the fall-out over the Skybolt affair in 1961, which eventually resulted in the agreement to give the Polaris missile to the British in 1962. It should be mentioned here that the McMahon Act which had previously kept all US military development secret from Britain and other allies had basically been repealed by this point. See also Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, 55.
 13. Dimbleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart*, 243.
 14. See the chapter on the Congo crisis in Ashton, *Irony of Interdependence*.
 15. Kent, 'Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1963', 12.
 16. '... the Union Minière hopes for a white enclave in Katanga ... We should make it clear that this [i]s not possible. It would only invite chaos'. Comment from Under Secretary of States George Ball during a discussion about the Congo at the White House, Memorandum of conversation, 28 April 1962, 755a.00/6-160, State Department, Central Files, Britain, National Archives and Records Administration, Maryland.
 17. Kalb, *Congo Cables*, 50.
 18. Déclaration sur Ultimatum, de Patrice Lumumba, Cabinet du Premier Ministre, Léopoldville, le 16 septembre 1960. Sujet : 'Décision Grave et Irrévocable Prise Par Le Gouvernement de La République Du Congo'. 1616, Indépendance du Congo IC (1616) 1.2 Publications. Commission de Coordination, Documents Congolais, Dossiers Africain, Des Archives du Ministre de Affaires Etrangères, Bruxelles. Hereinafter: AMAE.
 19. Letter from Hammarskjöld to Lumumba, 16 August 1960 outlining the his refusal to delay his departure on the grounds that it would be no advantage and a meeting of the 'Council' (presumably the Security Council) would take place only when the Congolese delegation was present. Congo Government Files, Box 1, ONUC Government Records, Records of the Office for Special Political Affairs, United Nations Archives, New York. Hereafter: UNA.
 20. République du Congo, Cabinet Ministre de la Défense Nationale, da P. Lumumba, Léopoldville, le 15 aout 1960. 'Le Gouvernement de la République du Congo au

- Gouvernement de : L'Union Soviétique. Aussi lettre de Gouvernement de la Chine populaire on 8 Septembre da Vice-Premier Antoine Gizenga'. 1616, Indépendance du Congo IC (1616) 1.2 Publications. Commission de Coordination, Documents Congolais, Dossiers Africain, AMAE.
21. Larry Devlin, *Chief of Station Congo, Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007) 65.
 22. Kalb, *Congo Cables*, 51.
 23. Devlin, *Chief of Station Congo*, 66.
 24. Ibid., 79–80.
 25. For further see Brian Urquhart, *Hammar skjöld* (London: Bodley Head, 1972), 478.
 26. Telegram from the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State. Brussels, 23 January 1961, Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–2361 Secret; Priority; limited distribution, *FRUS*, XX, 22.
 27. Comment from Secretary of State Dean Rusk at a staff meeting, 25 January 1961, Source: Department of State, Secretary's staff meetings; Lot 66D 147, *FRUS*, XX, 24.
 28. As detailed in Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, Washington, 1 February, Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo. Secret, *FRUS*, XX, 45–6. The principle elements were also outlined in a telegram from the Department of State to the embassy in India, dated 2nd February, Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.0012–261 Secret, Priority, *FRUS*, XX, 48.
 29. Memorandum of conversation, Washington, 4 February, Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/2–461, Confidential, *FRUS*, XX, 51.
 30. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, 142. See also full text of resolution: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/171/76/IMG/NR017176.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed October 17, 2014).
 31. For a full review of British foreign policy during the Congo crisis see Alan James, *Britain and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1963* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996). Ashton, *the Irony of Interdependence*.
 32. James, *Britain and the Congo Crisis*, 121.
 33. Kent, *American, the UN and Decolonization*, 45.
 34. E.B. Boothby, Foreign Office Minute, Discussion with Rusk, Stevenson and Sir P. Dean on tactics in Security Council, 20 February, 1961. FO 371/155103, NAL.
 35. Notes for Cabinet on February 21 1961, Congo, from African Department. FO 371/155103, NAL.
 36. Policy paper entitled 'Future of the Congo in the case of the failure of the United Nations Effort', for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, March 1961. PREM 11/3214, NAL.
 37. Letter to Macmillan from Kennedy, 23 February 1961. PREM 11/4590, NAL.
 38. The American Assistant-Secretary of State for African Affairs Mennen 'Soapy' Williams made a high profile visit to Africa in early 1961 which particularly irked the British in light of his subsequent reports. The nickname 'Soapy' came from the business in which he had made his fortune. Indicative of his attitude towards Africa, he was known throughout his time in this office for the refrain of: 'Africa, for the Africans! See also Ashton, 'Anglo-American Revival and Empire during the Macmillan Years, 1957–63', 173.
 39. Record of a conversation at dinner in Admiralty House, Monday February 27, 1961. PREM 11/4590, NAL.
 40. Confidential position paper on the Congo for the President in lieu of Macmillan visit, 4–9 April 1961, 31 March 1961, National Security Files, Box 174, UK Subjects, Macmillan Briefing Book, 4/4/1961–4/9/1961, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston. Hereafter: JFKL. This file was declassified in June 2010.
 41. Confidential telegram from Leopoldville to the foreign Office, 5 April 1961. FO 371/155075, NAL.
 42. Confidential position paper on the Congo for the President in lieu of Macmillan visit, 4–9 April 1961, 31 March 1961. National Security Files, Box 174, UK Subjects, Macmillan Briefing Book, 4/4/1961–4/9/1961. JFKL.

43. Confidential position paper on the Congo for the President in lieu of Macmillan visit, 4–9 April 1961, 31 March 1961. National Security Files, Box 174, UK Subjects, Macmillan Briefing Book, 4/4/1961–4/9/1961, JFKL.
44. Confidential letter on the Congo from P. Dean to Sir Frederick Hoyer Miller at the Foreign Office, 29 March 1961. FO 371/155075, NAL.
45. Dean even went so far as to say that in the current atmosphere, the debate would be to the benefit of the Russians. Confidential telegram from Patrick Dean in New York to the Foreign Office, 13 March 1961. FO 371/ 155104, NAL.
46. Namikas, *Battleground Africa*, 147.
47. 'They would in fact prefer a moratorium on United Nations discussion of the Congo', Confidential position paper on the Congo for the President in lieu of Macmillan visit, 4–9 April 1961, 31 March 1961. National Security Files, Box 174, UK Subjects, Macmillan Briefing Book, 4/4/1961–4/9/1961. JFKL.
48. Namikas, *Battleground Africa*, 149–52. See also Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, 154–60.
49. Kent, 'Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1963', 7.
50. It remains debated whether or not Hammarskjöld, who was on a flight to Leopoldville at the precise moment when the operation was launched, gave his full consent and even knew the full details of the plan, which was organised by UN officials in Katanga including his SRSO Conor Cruise O'Brien. For more see Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence*, 413–18 and Williams, *Who Killed Hammarskjöld?*
51. Namikas, *Battleground Africa*, 151.
52. For further details on this see Williams, *Who Killed Hammarskjöld?*
53. Memo from Millar to the Secretary of State detailing the legal analysis of the UN's position according to Vallet, and the reflections of the Lord Privy Seal when the policy was discussed, 1 November 1961, FO 371/155100, NAL.
54. Telephone records, Ball and Vance agree that the UN requires the supply of aircraft, 12:15pm, 12 November 1961, George Ball Papers, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library Princeton. Hereafter: MLP. The resolution 'Authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries, as laid down in paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 161 A (1961) of 21 February 1961'; <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0171/76/IMG/NR017176.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed October 16, 2014).
55. Meeting of the Cabinet at Admiralty House, 14 November 1961, CAB 128/35, Cabinet Records, NAL.
56. Meeting of the Cabinet at Admiralty House, 14 November 1961, CAB 128/35, Cabinet Records, NAL.
57. Alistair Horne, *Macmillan, The Official Biography* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 401.
58. Meeting of the Cabinet at Admiralty House, 7 November 1961, CAB 128/35, Cabinet Records, NAL.
59. Exchange of letter between Acting Secretary-General U Thant and British Permanent Representative to the United Nations Sir Patrick Dean, 7–8 December 1961, S-209-0018-12 United Kingdom, ONUC Records on Foreign Countries, Records of the Office for Special Political Affairs, UNA.
60. Harold Macmillan, *Pointing the Way, 1959–1961* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1972), 449.
61. Meeting of the Cabinet at Admiralty House, 11 December 1961, CAB 128/35, Cabinet Records, NAL.
62. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, 116. Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence*, 450–5.
63. Meeting of the Cabinet at Admiralty House, 11 December 1961, CAB 128/35, Cabinet Records, NAL.
64. Telegram from UK Delegation to the UN, 12 December 1961, PREM11/3168, NAL.

65. Aide-Memoir from the British Government to the Acting Secretary-General, 13 December 1961, S-209-0018-12 United Kingdom, ONUC Records on Foreign Countries, Records of the Office for Special Political Affairs, UNA.
66. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, 117.
67. Mahoney reports that the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak sent the President copies of Belgium's formal complaints to the United Nations. The Chairman of the board of Union Minière went even further, returning to Kennedy the US Freedom Medal awarded to him in 1946 due to the 'indiscriminate killing by the hired killers of the United Nations'. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*, 116.
68. Telephone records, Ball and Cleveland. 1:30pm, 31 October 1961, George Ball Papers, MLP.
69. Namikas, *Battleground Africa*, 154–6. See also Kalb, *Congo Cables*, 316–18.
70. This Committee formed in 1961, condemning the UN attacks on the 'peace-loving and Western friendly Katangese'. By the end of 1962 they had over 3000 supporters. American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters, RH WL Eph 198, Title: Ephemeral Materials, 1961, (OCOLC) 17949950, Control No: ocm18265195, Wilcox Collection for Political Movements, Kansas University Library. For more detail see Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, 168–71.
71. Kalb, *Congo Cables*, 317.
72. Peter Clarke, *Hope and Glory, Britain 1900-2000* (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 267.
73. Macmillan, *Pointing the Way*, 451.
74. Ashton, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War*, 126. Telegram from Thomas Finletter, US ambassador to France to the Secretary of State on the status of US and UK talks on the UN, 14 July 1962, Folder 2 United Nations, Box 128, President's Office Files, JFKL.
75. Telegram from Thomas Finletter, US ambassador to France to the Secretary of State on the status of US and UK talks on the UN, 14 July 1962, Folder 2 United Nations, Box 128, President's Office Files, JFKL. Horne, *Macmillan*, 402.
76. The actual quote is from Horne but this view is shared by Ashton, Ball and James, See Horne, *Macmillan*, 402.
77. Telegram from Dean to the Foreign Office, 11 December 1961, FO 371/155107, NAL.
78. Telegram from Dean to the Foreign Office, 11 December 1961, FO 371/155107, NAL.
79. James, *Britain and the Congo Crisis*, 150.
80. Horne, *Macmillan*, 402.
81. Kalb, *Congo Cables*, 316.
82. Horne, *Macmillan 1957–1986*, 403, See also Ashton, 'Anglo-American Revival and Empire during the Macmillan Years', 174.
83. Kalb, *Congo Cables*, 322.
84. Ashton, *Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War*, 126.
85. Telegram from Thomas Finletter, US ambassador to France to the Secretary of State on the status of US and UK talks on the UN, 14 July 1962, Folder 2 United Nations, Box 128, President's Office Files, JFKL.
86. Letter from Patrick Dean to Rodger Stevens at the Foreign office, 2 December 1961 concerning the negotiations for the 24 November resolution and differences with the Americans at the UN. FO 371/155107, NAL.
87. Ashton, *Irony of Interdependence*, 119.

Notes on the contributor

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